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One common objection used
to undermine a public plan option in health care reform is the idea
of "cost shifting." Opponents of a public plan say that this
supposed cost shifting is one of the problems with Medicare, our
nation's current public health care option. They say that Medicare
underpays health care providers, with the result that private
insurers end up subsidizing those same health care providers because
Medicare has underpaid them.[1]
The argument claims that a public plan would not be "fair" to
private health insurers; that private health insurers could not
compete with a public plan because they would be, in effect,
subsidizing the public plan, or that a public plan would result in a
health care reform package that is too expensive.
The truth, however, is
that a public plan is needed to provide more and better competition
and lower overall health care costs. This is particularly true
given the increasing consolidation of the insurance market resulting
in fewer and fewer private health insurers.
Private health insurance
companies are some of the most profitable corporations in the
nation. According to insurance industry filings with the federal
Securities and Exchange Commission, profits for the 10 largest
publicly traded health insurance companies rose 428% from 2000 to
2007, from $2.4 billion to $12.9 billion. As examples, Aetna's
profits increased by 1,342% during this 2000-2007 period;
Wellpoint's profits increased by 1,380%[2];
Humana's by 827%; and UnitedHealth Group's by 532%[3].
If it were true that
Medicare's proven cost effectiveness is subsidized by private health
insurers through cost-shifting, it certainly does not seem to be
affecting the huge profitability of those private insurers. And it
surely is not affecting the compensation of their chief executive
officers. In fact, in 2007, the CEOs of these 10 companies
collected combined compensation of $118.6 million, roughly $11.9
million each. This is 468 times more than the $25,434 that
the average American earned!
The fact is that a large
proportion of Medicare spending goes directly to private insurance
plans under the completely private portions of Medicare - the
Medicare Advantage and Medicare Prescription Drug programs.
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, 34% of Medicare payments
are made to private insurance companies for the private portions of
Medicare. Moreover, 77% of the costs of the private Medicare
Prescription Drug program are paid out of general government
revenues (not out of the Medicare tax which employees pay).
In fact, the first year
after private Medicare Advantage was introduced (with subsidies way
over and above the actual cost to traditional Medicare to treat a
Medicare beneficiary) the solvency projection of Medicare dropped by
eight years.
[4] Clearly, substantial cost shifting from private insurers TO
Medicare is occurring; not the other way around. The cost of private
Medicare is contributing to the federal deficit because a high
proportion of it is paid for out of general revenues, not the
Medicare trust fund. Meanwhile, private health insurance companies'
profits, paid in large part by taxpayers, are increasing
astronomically.
Perhaps even more
shocking, while opponents of a public plan argue that Medicare
shifts costs to private insurance companies, the fact is that
private insurers shift health care costs to the very people whom
they are supposed to be serving. They do this by covering fewer sick
people, most often by denying coverage for pre-existing conditions,
cancelling insurance or raising premiums to unpayable levels when
plan-holders become sick. Further, private insurers shift costs by
increasing premiums and cost sharing, such as deductibles and
co-insurance, for those they do continue to insure.
Recently, Wendell Potter,
a former health insurance industry executive with CIGNA (which had a
net income in 2007 of $1.115 billion) testified before the U.S.
Senate's Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.[5]
Here is some of what he had to say:
"In the 15 years since insurance companies
killed the Clinton [health reform] plan, the industry has
consolidated to the point that it is now dominated by a cartel of
large for-profit insurers….To help meet Wall Street's relentless
profit expectations, insurers routinely dump policyholders who are
less profitable or who get sick. Insurers have several ways to cull
the sick. One is policy rescission.[6]
They look carefully to see if a sick policyholder may have omitted a
minor illness, a pre-existing condition, when applying for coverage,
and then they use that as a justification to cancel the policy…
Dumping a small number of enrollees can have a big effect on the
bottom line. Ten percent of the population accounts for two-thirds
of all health care spending."
"They also dump small businesses whose
employees' medical claims exceed what insurance underwriters
expected. All it takes is one illness or accident among employees at
a small business to prompt an insurance company to hike the next
year's premiums so high that an employer has to cut benefits, shop
for another carrier, or stop offering coverage altogether - leaving
workers uninsured. This practice is known as purging….[T]he number
of small businesses offering coverage to their employees has fallen
from 61 percent to 38 percent since 1993, according to the National
Small Business Association. Once an insurer purges a business, there
are often no other viable choices in the health insurance market
because of rampant industry consolidation."
The consolidation of
private health insurers is no small matter when it comes to
controlling the escalating costs of health care in the United
States. According to a 2009 report of the American Medical
Association, "the country's largest health insurers have continued
to pursue aggressive acquisition strategies. The largest insurer,
WellPoint (formed from the merger of Anthem, Inc and WellPoint
Health Networks) has acquired 11 health insurers since 2000. The
second largest health insurer, UnitedHealth Group, has also acquired
11 health insurers since 2000.[7]
[8] A 2003 study found that the market concentration of private
health insurance companies in 34 states was high enough that, when
the measure used by the U.S. Department of Justice and the federal
Trade Commission was applied to these concentrations, all 34 states
were deemed "highly concentrated" and therefore of anti-trust
concern.[9]
In 2007, more than half of the health insurance markets
in at least 39 states were controlled by two carriers.[10]
And yet, despite this
extraordinary consolidation, insurers aren't leveraging better
values for their customers:
"Dominant insurers do not seem to use
their market power to drive hard bargains with providers, for at
least four reasons. First, they believe…that they cannot attract
enrollees without flagship hospitals. As a consequence, large and
expensive teaching hospitals have little incentive to negotiate with
insurers and lower prices. Second, small insurers do not
aggressively compete over price…..[S]maller insurers do not seem to
compete on premiums to gain market share but rather seem to follow
the pricing of the dominant insurer. Competition in insurance
markets is often about getting the lower risk enrollees as opposed
to competing on price and the efficient delivery of care. Third, the
market is affected by lack of clear information to effectively shop
for plans based on benefits, price and quality. Without active
competition, the dominant insurers have no need to bargain
aggressively with providers. Finally, the consolidation of hospital
systems that has occurred in recent years has also limited insurers'
ability to negotiate with hospitals for lower rates."[11]
Thus, the health
insurance market functions irrationally. Consolidation of the
insurance market has resulted in the absence of adequate competition
which would, under normal circumstances, be expected to drive down
costs. Even if smaller insurers could compete on price, they do not
because the name of the game for health insurers is to maximize
profits by "lowering their risks", which means not insuring the less
healthy, or increasing cost sharing and otherwise shifting risk to
insured persons. Shopping for a health insurance plan is difficult,
because of the absence of standardized plans which would make
comparison shopping easier. As a result, careful consumers cannot
drive down prices either.
A broad and vibrant
public plan would provide a solution to all of these problems. It
would provide competition to private insurers in already overly
concentrated markets. With sufficient enrollment, enrollment that is
not limited as envisioned under some current proposals, it would
have sufficient market share to negotiate forcefully with providers
to drive down costs, and open up competition in markets for other
smaller private insurers.
By offering a standard
basic plan, and requiring that private insurers do the same, a
public plan option would help consumers make more informed choices
about choosing health insurance, and would allow consumers to
rationally choose health insurance based on quality and price.
Finally, a public plan – not guided by the profit motive, but able
to contain costs and have lower administrative overhead than private
health plans - would provide the option of health insurance to all,
regardless of a person's health status and desirability in terms of
"risk."
Health reform without a
public plan will result in escalating costs, insufficient decreases
in the number of uninsured persons, and a continuation of vast
profits for health insurance companies, at the expense of the health
of all the American people. The time for a public plan has come, and
that time is now.
[1] This notion is
asserted by a study commissioned in part by America's Health
Insurance Plans, the lobbying organization of commercial
health insurers, as well as by the Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association. Fox and Pickering, "Payment Level Comparison of
Medicare, Medicaid, and Commercial Payers," December 2008.
Available at
http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?docid=25216.
[6] The Los Angeles
Times reports that employee evaluations by Blue Cross of
California included an assessment of rescission activity. "Wellpoint's
Blue Cross of California subsidiary and two other insurers
saved more than $300 million in medical claims by cancelling
more than 20,000 sick policyholders over a five-year
period". Similarly, the Times reported "Health Net, Inc.
paid bonuses to employees based in part on their involvement
in rescinding policyholders. According to internal corporate
documents disclosed through litigation, health Net saved $35
million over six years by rescinding policyholders". Girion,
"Blue Cross Praised Employees Who Dropped Sick
Policyholders, Lawmaker Says", Los Angeles Times, June 17,
2009. Available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/17/business/fi-rescind17.
[9] Holahan, J and
Blumberg, L, "Can A Public Insurance Plan Increase
Competition and Lower the Costs of Health Reform?" Urban
Institute, (2008). Available at:
www.healthpolicycenter.org.
[10] Center for
American Progress, "Most American Insurance Markets Limited
to Few Providers", June 16, 2009. Available at
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/health_competition_map.html.
Example (from 2007) 80% Iowa's private health insurance
market was controlled by two companies (one of which,
Wellmark, controlled 71% of the Iowa's market); 85% of
Montana's private health insurance market was controlled by
two companies (one of which, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Montana controlled 75% of Montana's market); 88% of Maine's
market was controlled by two companies (WellPoint controlled
78% of Maine's market); 81% of Arkansas' market was
controlled by two companies (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Arkansas controlled 75% of Arkansas' market); and 66% of
Connecticut's market was controlled by two companies (Anthem
controlled 55% of the Connecticut market).
[11] Holahan, J and
Blumberg, L, "Can A Public Insurance Plan Increase
Competition and Lower the Costs of Health Reform?" Urban
Institute, (2008), at p. 3. Available at:
www.healthpolicycenter.org.
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